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NOTES
PARTIES AS ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS
This note is written by way of inquiry into the soundness of a decision
recently handed down by a Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia County.
Trial of the case still pending, it is perhaps ethical to omit the name. The facts
of the case are briefly these: Mrs. A and her infant son, A Jr. were traveling in an
automobile owned by Mrs. A. B driving his autonxrbile collided with the car ot
Mrs. A. Both Mrs. A and B were negligent. A Jr. was injured. Mr. and Mrs. A
sued in their own right and as next friend of A Jr. B attempted to bring Mrs. A
on the record as an additional defendant by a writ of scire facias. Upon the motion
of Mrs. A the writ was stricken off. The reasons advanced in sustaining the motion
to strike off may be divided into two fields. The first objections to this procedure
are based on substantive law; the second on the application of the Sci. Fa. Act
itself. These will be considered in order.
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It is argued that Mrs. A, if joined as a party defendant, would be in the
anomalous position of bringing suit against herself. The impossibility of such
a suit seems to be generally accepted and it is not the purpose of this note to
question the decisions in which this rule was enunciated. An examination of these
cases will show that they are, without exception, cases in which the plaintiff, if he
did recover a judgment, would be forced to pay it himself.1
Manifestly this is not the result in the case stated above. It is pointless to argue
that under the Act of 1933, P. L. 807, Mrs. A is allowed to recover from herself
as added defendant and thus comes within the objection. In the first place, if it
were possible to so recover, Mrs. A would collect from B rather than pay it herself.
Secondly, it will appear later that it is not possible for Mrs. A to collect from herself
and thus she has no alternative other than executing on the property of the original
defendant B.
The most quoted objection of the courts to a party appearing on the record
as both plaintiff and defendant is that the two positions are utterly inconsistent.
It is conceded that where the positions are in fact, so inconsistent, the rule should
not be relaxed. In the stated case, this objection is groundless. The court felt
that as plaintiff, Mrs. A was bound to do her best to establish the negligence of
the defendants. On the other hand, as defendant, Mrs. A would try to prove that
such was not the case at all and that she was free from blame. The answer to this
is that Mrs. A does not allege or attempt to prove the negligence of the additional
defendant who is Mrs. A herself. The negligence of the additional defendant is
the worry of B and the burden is upon him to prove it.
Mrs. A's position is almost precisely the same as that of a plaintiff in the very
common case where contributory negligence is alleged as a defense to recovery.
Were Mrs. A to sue B alone and, as is the usual case, were B to allege that Mrs.
A was contributorially negligent, Mrs. A would be striving to prove the negligence
of B and as defendant in fact if not in name, she would be trying to establish her
own freedom from negligence. In the present case, Mrs. A sues and tries to establish the negligence of B. B meanwhile, tries to establish the negligence of Mrs. A
precisely as he would do were he asserting contributory negligence as a defense.
In the case stated, B wishes to establish the negligence of Mrs. A for two reasons.
The first reason is that by proving the negligence of Mrs. A he bars any recovery
in the suit brought by Mr. and Mrs. A in their own right. The second reason is
that he wishes to enforce his right of contribution as regards the recovery by A Jr.
The Act of April 4, 1929, P. L. 140 amending Section 13 of the Act of May 14,
1915, P. L. 483, (Practice Act) provides that a defendant may not only deny his
own negligence but may set out in his affidavit of defense the negligence of the
plaintiff and set up a claim of damages against the plaintiff arising out of the
lDeWitt v. DeWitt, 38 Pa. C.C. 689 (1911); Griffith v. Chew's Ex., 8 S. & R. 17, (1807);
Eichelberger v. Morris, 6 Watts 42 (1837).
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circumstances upon which the plaintiff's case is based. It is submitted that since
the position of the defendant claiming damages under this statute or when asserting the defense of contributory negligence is not regarded as inconsistent, the
allegation of inconsistent positions should not be advanced as a ground for sustaining Mrs. A's motion to strike off the writ.
The next reason advanced by the court derives whatever cogency it possesses
from the common law rules concerning suits within the family. It is said that were
Mrs. A made a party defendant, A Jr. would be suing his parent in tort and such
suits are not permitted. Further it is said that Mr. A would be suing Mrs. A in
tort and such suits are not allowed. Suits within the family on claims arising in
tort have been barred because the courts fear they would cause discord in the har;
mony of the family. While the danger of such discord seems to be somewhat overestimated, (criminal proceedings may be instituted and suits brought concerning
property), the soundness of the ruling is not questioned when the reasons supposedly justifying its existence are present. The danger of family discord is not present
in the stated case for the reason that the husband, Mr. A would execute his judgment against the property of the defendant B. Under the present law this is the
only thing he could do. The danger of family discord is present in any case only
when the judgment recovered by one spouse rrust be paid by the other. As we have
said, such is not possible in the stated case.
No dissension in family harmony would result from the fact that it appears
from the record that A Jr. is suing his mother in tort. Under the present law,
A Jr. is not permitted to sue his mother in tort and therefore he could not recover
a judgment against his mother as added defendant under the facts. This would
be the result even though the Sci. Fa. Act purports to allow the plaintiff to recover
against the added defendant. The danger of imperiling the integrity of the honle
is absent. In Briggs v. Philadelphia,2 the court said,
"There has never been a common law rule that a child could not sue
its parents. But there is substantial decisional authority that it is not
permitted on the theory that it would be disruptive of the family peace,
destructive of the enforcement of discipline, and therefore against
public policy. We recognize the wisdom of these rulings as the state
is vitally interested in the integrity of, and harniony in, the family."
If no judgment is to be recovered against the parent, the child is not recovering from its parent and it is difficult to see where the objection of the court has
any application. It would be absurd to argue that the mere presence of the son on
the record as a plaintiff and that of his parent as a defendant would endanger the
home. It would seem that where the reasons justifying the existence of the rule
2112 Pa. Super. 50 (1934).
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are absent, and the assertion of the rule inflicts unwarranted hardship, the rule
should be inapplicable. Such a distinction would be in line with the modern trend
of authorities allowing an infant to recover against its parent in tort where the
parent by his negligence has injured the child and the parent is protected by insurance. 3 To hold that the infant is not to be allowed to recover against the insurance company because on the record at least, he is suing his parent in tort, and
such suits are disruptive of family harmony is little short of ridiculous.
The objectionable results following a mechanical application of the rule that
a child may not, under any circumstances, sue his parent in tort, appear more clearly when the question is studied from another angle. It is accepted law in Pennsylvania that a joint tort feasor may enforce his right of contribution from his
co-tort feasor when it appears that the tort committed was not wilful or intentional. 4 It would seem that there is nothing to prevent B from bringing a separate action to enforce his right of contribution from Mrs. A as the accident occurred as a result of joint negligence. B's exercise of his right of contribution
would enable A Jr. to do indirectly that which the law does not permit him to do
directly. It is submitted that this recovery is in no manner the main purpose
of joining Mrs. A as an additional defendant. It is but an incidental result of
the exercise of a distinct legal right in and by B.
The statement that a right of contribution exists in favor of B will doubtless
be challenged on the ground that since Mrs. A is not legally responsible to A Jr.,
there is no common liability which is said to be the basis of the right of contribution. It is said that equality between those whose positions are not equal is inequitable. The only case in Pennsylvania in which the basis of the right of contribution
has been discussed is a lower court case. 5 The court said:
"'To determine this question it is necessary to consider whether contributionship rests on joint tortfeasorship or upon joint liability. If
the former, the duty to contribute would exist regardless of whether
they were both liable to the person injured, and, if the latter, the duty
would not arise where one is liable and the other is not; as, for
instance, in the case of the joint negligence of a charity and an individual."
Whether one argues that the right of contribution is enforceable on the
theory of joint tortfeasorship or on the theory of joint liability, it is not denied
that the foundation of the right rests on natural justice and equitable principles. 6
SDunlap v. Dunlap, 150 At. 905 (N. H., 1930).
4Horbach's Administrators v. Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851); Armstrong County v. Clarion County,
66 Pa. 218 (1870); Goldman et al. v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354 (1928).
6Cohen v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Co., 13 Pa. D. & C. 465 (1930).
SArmstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870).
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It does not seem to be a furtherance of such natural justice to hold that a tort feasor
may defend a demand for contribution by the assertion of an immunity from
suit which the law accords him for very different reasons. A Jr. did not institute
this suit. His parents did that and now contend that if in this suit, they are held
responsible for their wrong-doing, the harmony of their home will be imperiled.
The injustice of denying B his right of contribution on the strength of this argument clearly appears. It is pertinent to note that while a child may not bring a
civil action against his parent for support, a third party who has sold necessaries
to the infant is not to be denied a recovery from the delinquent parent because such
7
recovery impairs the sanctity of the home.
In further support of their refusal to permit B to join Mrs. A as an additional
defendant, the court refers to the statute itself and contends that the inclusion
of such parties as parties defendants was never intended. The objection may oe
referred to as the "third party rule". In the case of First National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Baird,8 the court'said that the statute in referring to additional defendants meant third parties. This ruling has been interpreted to mean that each suit
must have a plaintiff and a defendant and that the added defendant must be a
third party, another individual. A passing glance at the facts of that case will
show that such was not the ruling. To arrive at the proper interpretation of the
"third party rule" it is necessary to briefly state the facts of that case. The plaintiff sued the defendant on a promissory note. The defendant contended that he
was but an accommodation maker and that Mr. X was the real debtor. The defendant issued a writ of scire facias to join X as an added defendant. While a motion
to quash the writ was pending, judgment was entered against the defendant tor
want of an affidavit of defense. The defendant argued that the purpose of the
statute was to make the added defendant liable to the plaintiff just as though the
plaintiff had sued him as defendant in the first instance. The court ridiculed this
argument, pointing out that if this were so, the plaintiff would often be required
to proceed against one as to whom he had no cause of action. The court said that
the added defendant was a third party. Clearly the court meant that the added
defendant was as to the plaintiff, a third party, a party against whom he had no
cause of action. The plaintiff acquired no rights because of the joinder of X and
there was no reason to deny him his right to proceed against the original defendant
instead of delaying while the original defendant and the added defendant fought
out an issue of no interest to the plaintiff. The rule that the added defendant
was a third party was based on the fact that the added defendant was not liable
to the plaintiff, and not on the number of parties on the record and their names.
It appears that to apply this holding to the instant case is to misinterpret the ruling
of that case. If one wishes to follow the argument to its logical conclusion, we
7

John Wanamaker v. Lipps, 3 Pa. D. & C. 451 (1922).
8300 Pa. 92 (1930).
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find that since Mrs. A is not liable to herself she is a third party, (not liable to
the plaintiff) and therefore there is no objection to joining her as an added defendant. No rights are acquired by her as a result of the joinder of the added defendant
who is Mrs. A herself and therefore the suit against B proceeds just as though she
had never been added. Nor does the Act of 1933 vitalize this dead objection. At
first glance it seems that it might have some application because the plaintiff may
now recover from the added defendant and it might be argued that since this is so,
the added defendant is not a third party under the ruling of First NationalBank of
Pittsburghv. Baird, supra. It suffices to note that the plaintiff may recover from
the added defendant only when it appears that the suit could have been brought
against the added defendant on the same cause of action as is the basis of the
present suit. Since the court holds that a party may not sue himself, it can not
appear that as added defendant he is liable to himself as plaintiff.
In the case of First National Bank of Pittsburghv. Baird,9 supra, after setting
out the argument of the defendant that it was the purpdse of the Act to make the
additional defendant liable just as though the plaintiff had sued him in the first
instance, the court said,
"Appellants whole contention on the point is built on the word 'defendants' in the clause 'additional defendants'. The legislature might
just as well have used the words third parties and then this supposed
argurnent could not have been made."
Clearly this ruling has reference to the liabilities between the parties. It has
no application to the number or names of the parties but deals solely with their
liabilities.
The Supreme Court is responsible for the common misapplication of the
10
"third party rule". In Shapiro v.Philadelphia
the plaintiff sued both the City
of Philadelphia and the transit company for injuries suffered by reason of the
negligence of the defendants. The City attempted to bring the transit company on
the record as an additional defendant. The purpose was to enable the City to
enforce its right of contribution without the expense of a separate suit, should the
judgment be executed against the City alone. The lower court made absolute a
rule to strike off the writ and this ruling was sustained by the Supreme Court. The
court said:
"The court below quashed the writ because it could not undersfand how
one who was already a defendant could be an additional defendant
or third party as we defined those words in First National Bank of
Pittsburgh v. Baird, 300 Pa. 92. The manifest purpose of the Act
9300 Pa. 92 (1930).
10306 Pa. 216 (1932).
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is to enable the defendants who have been sued to bring upon the record as additional defendants those not already there who are alleged
to be liable to those who are. The procedure establishing this liability
is not specified in the statute but is wisely left to be worked out by the
judiciary. In doing this however, we can not interpret it so as to make
one an additional defendant who is not, and can not be 'additional'
as to the defendant or defendants already there. As the only complaint made against the court below was its refusal to permit this impossible thing, we must, of course, affirm its order."
The sagacity of the legislature in permitting the courts to handle the details
of the Act is questionable. It appears that the court misapplies its own rule as laid
1
down in the First National Bank of Pittsburgh v.Baird case, supra. The courts
have worked out the details so that if a plaintiff sues the defendants as joint defendants, the tort feasor paying the judgment must bring a separate suit to enforce
his right of contribution. If, however, the plaintiff sues but one of the parties responsible and the party sued brings the other responsible party on the record by a
writ of scire facias, the right and extent of contribution may be settled in the
single suit. This senseless distinction is drawn though the proof, issues and op12
portunities to defend are the same in both cases. In Shapiro v. Philadelphia,
supra, the court continues:
"It is true also, that as the record now is, the city can not have the issue
between it and the transit company determined prior to the trial between the plaintiff and the original defendant as it might be able to do
if the transit company were an additional defendant; but if this is so
important as to require compulsory process to enforce it, complaint
will have to be made to the legislature."
Just how the right and extent of contribution between two negligent tort
feasors could be determined prior to any recovery against either is a matter of conjecture. In all events, the court recognizes the desirability of permitting the legislature to handle the details.
Now to revert to the original argument advanced by the court. Is Mrs. A
bringing suit against herself? Clearly she is not. As we noted before, under the
present law, as against herself she has no cause of action. A party may not bring
suit against himself. Under the Act of 1933 amending the Act of 1929,13 the
added defendant is liable to the plaintiff only when it appears that the plaintiff
could have brought the suit against the added defendant in the first instance on
11300 Pa. 92 (1930).
12306 Pa. 216 (1932).
IsAct of Apr. 4, 1929, P.L. 140, amending Sec. 13 of Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483.
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this same cause of action. Thus it can not appear that Mrs. A is liable to herself
and her position on the record as both plaintiff and defendant goes no further than
the caption of the suit.
For the same reason, Mr. A is not suing Mrs. A. His part of the action proceeds against B just as tho Mrs. A had not been added as a defendant. The same
is true of the suit by A Jr.
To sum up the whole situation, B wishes to join Mrs. A as an additional defendant to secure and enforce his right of contribution in the same action and upon
the same proof as establishes his liability to A Jr. The first reason advanced by
the court for denying him this right is that a party may not appear on the record as
both plaintiff and defendant. While such dual position is occupied as a matter ot
fact in cases where a defendant asserts the defense of contributory negligence or
asserts a claim under the amendment to the Practice Act, cited supra, the presence
of his name on the record as both a plaintiff and defendant is fatal. The family
harmony argument is applied though logically it has no application. The "third
party rule" is misinterpreted and misapplied, of necessity, limiting the remedial
effect of the Act in whole. Under the present ruling of the court, B to enforce his
right of contribution must bring a separate suit. The patently undesirable features
of such procedure are best stated by the court itself. In Vinnacombe v. Philadelphia,1 4 the court said:
"The Act is a remedial one. Its purpose is to avoid a multiplicity of
suits; to compel every interested person to appear and defend the action by the plaintiff; and to save the original defendant from possible
harm resulting from loss of evidence as might result if compelled to
await the end of the suit before proceeding against those who are primarily liable in whole or in part. Hence the statute is to be liberally
construed to advance the legislative purpose."
It is submitted that the above chaotic situation should be remedied either by
a complete and intelligent discussion of the whole matter by the Supreme Court or
by action by the legislature.
Two very recent cases confirm the views hereinbefore set forth.
In the case of Koontz v. Messer, 181 Ad. 792 (Pa., 1935), the wife was injured by the negligence of her husband. At the time of the accident, the husband
was acting as servant of his employers. The wife sued the employer who issued
a writ of scire facias bringing the husband of the plaintiff on the record as an
additional defendant, alleging that he was liable over to the employer.
The court, after reviewing the authorities, held that the marital immunity
of the husband could not be claimed by the master. The court points out that
14297 Pa. 564 (1929).
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such immunity is based upon the policy of preserving domestic peace and felicity
and that this policy is not furthered by extending the immunity to the master.
To the argument that the presence of the husband on the record as a defendant
was sufficient to bar the suit by the wife, the court points out that the suit by the
wife proceeds exactly as if the husband had not been joined.
The court cites with approval the case of Chase v. New Haven Waste Material
Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 Atl. 107 (1930) in which an unemancipated minor was
permitted to recover against the master for the negligence of its parent, a servant
of the master.
The effect of this case is to remove several of the questions considered in this
note. With the court's clear definition of the limits, within which the immunity from
suit by members of a family may be asserted, it would appear to be proper tor B
to join Mrs. A as an additional defendant.
While there is nothing in the decision relating directly to the theory of the
right of contribution between joint tortfeasors it would seem to be settled that a
joint tortfeasor could not defend a demand for contribution by the assertion of a
marital or parental immunity from suit as preventing the presence of the basis
of the right, i. e., joint liability to the plaintiff.
It would seem that under the interpretation of the principle of Koontz v.
Messer, 181 Atl. 792 (Pa., 1935), as discussed in the case of Murray v. Lavinsky,
120 Pa. Super. 392 (1936), that B, in the supposed case, could allege that Mrs.
A is jointly liable with him, rather then liable over to him. To hold that since
Mrs. A. is not liable directly to her son, A Jr., and therefore not jointly liable with
B to A Jr. and thus not within the terms of the statute, would be a gross injustice.
This appears when one remembers that in the case of Koontz v. Messer, supra, the
defendant was permitted to bring the husband of the plaintiff on the record as in
additional defendant, on the theory that the husband was liable over to the original
defendant. In other words, the original defendant was entitled to be indemnified
by the husband of the plaintiff for any loss, while in the present case, the orriginal
defendant seeks only partial indemnification, his right of contribution.
Robert Lewis Blewitt

VENUE IN THE HAUPTMANN CASE
Although a great deal has been written and said about the Hauptmann case,
or more exactly the case of State v. Hauptmann, 180 At. 809, very little has been
said about the substantive points of law involved. Much has been written about the
admissibility of evidence, the competency of witnesses, and the general ballyhoo
which surrounded the trial. The purely legal aspects of the case have not been dealt

